Unveiling the Mysteries of Ancient Military Strategies: Secrets Revealed
The Great Unveiling of Mysterious Military Strategies in Ancient Warfare
Throughout the long river of human history, warfare has always been an inescapable topic. From the clanging of weapons in the cold weapon era to the period of gradual rise of firearms, countless military strategists, relying on their outstanding wisdom, created numerous mysterious and exquisite military strategies. These strategies not only played crucial roles on the battlefields of their time, but also provided valuable reference for subsequent military research and warfare practices.
Deceiving Heaven and Crossing the Sea: Covert Strategies for Victory Through Surprise

"Deceiving Heaven and Crossing the Sea," this strategy appears simple on the surface, yet contains profound wisdom. It emphasizes completing strategic deployments or launching sudden attacks when the enemy is completely unprepared. This strategy can be traced back to the Sui Dynasty. In 589 AD, the Sui Dynasty prepared to cross the Yangtze River to attack the Chen State. At that time, the Yangtze River stood as a natural barrier, and the Chen State, confident in this natural defense, did not pay excessive attention to the Sui army's attacks. The Sui general He Ruobi was ordered to command the river defense. He adopted a series of actions to deceive the Chen State. He frequently organized troop rotations along the river, and each rotation was conducted with great fanfare, making the Chen State believe that the Sui army was about to cross the river for an attack. Consequently, the Chen State hastily assembled troops to prepare for battle. However, the Sui army was merely rotating troops, not actually attacking. After repeating this many times, the Chen State gradually became accustomed to it and paid no more attention to large-scale movements by the Sui army. Meanwhile, He Ruobi sold the old horses used for rotation and purchased large quantities of ships from the Chen State, hiding them away. He also purchased fifty to sixty broken ships and moored them on the riverbank. After reconnaissance by Chen State spies, they concluded that the Sui army had no ships for crossing the river. Thus, with the Chen State's guard down, He Ruobi suddenly led his troops across the river. By the time the Chen State discovered the crossing, the Sui army had already successfully landed. The Sui forces then advanced unstoppably and ultimately destroyed the Chen State. This strategy of using prolonged disguise and deception to lower the enemy's guard and thereby achieve strategic objectives was subsequently applied in many later wars. For example, in some small-scale border conflicts, various tribes and powers also employed similar methods, concealing their actual troop strength and attack intentions to launch sudden strikes against unprepared enemies and gain victory.
Surrounding Wei to Rescue Zhao: The Brilliant Strategy of Attacking the Weak While Avoiding the Strong

Surrounding Wei to Rescue Zhao is an exceptionally creative military strategy. It originated during the Warring States period. In 354 BC, the Wei State army besieged the Zhao State capital of Handan. Zhao requested assistance from Qi State. The King of Qi appointed Tian Ji as the commanding general and Sun Bin as military advisor to lead troops to rescue Zhao. Sun Bin did not directly march to Handan to engage Wei's main forces in battle. Instead, he analyzed the current situation. He believed that Wei's elite troops were all engaged in attacking Zhao, leaving the country's interior empty. If they attacked Wei's capital Daliang at this time, the Wei army would certainly be forced to return to defend it. Therefore, he recommended that Tian Ji lead the Qi army in a direct assault on Daliang. Tian Ji accepted Sun Bin's suggestion, and the Qi army rapidly marched toward Daliang. Upon learning the news, the Wei army indeed hastily withdrew from Handan to return and defend Daliang. Sun Bin then set up an ambush at Guiling, a necessary passage for the Wei army's retreat. When the Wei army, exhausted from their rush back, arrived at Guiling, the Qi army suddenly launched an attack, dealing the Wei forces a crushing defeat and successfully relieving Zhao's siege. This strategy of avoiding direct confrontation with the enemy's main strength, instead attacking the enemy's vital points to force them to send reinforcements, thereby annihilating them during their movements, provided new ideas for later military strategists. In modern warfare, similar battle examples exist. For instance, in some rear guerrilla warfare, when enemies concentrate forces to encircle our base areas, our guerrilla forces would attack the enemy's logistical supply lines or key positions, forcing the enemy to divide their forces for defense, thereby reducing pressure on the base area and seeking opportunities to strike the enemy during their movements.
Secretly Marching to Chen Cang: Surprise Tactics Through Deception

The strategy of "Secretly Marching to Chen Cang" also originated during the Chu-Han contention period. In 206 BC, Liu Bang was enfeoffed by Xiang Yu as the King of Han and was forced to proceed to Hanzhong. To lull Xiang Yu into complacency, Liu Bang followed Zhang Liang's advice and burned the plank roads from Guanzhong to Hanzhong, indicating he had no intention of moving eastward. However, in August of 206 BC, Liu Bang prepared to move eastward to contend for supremacy. At this time, Han Xin proposed the strategy of "Openly Repairing the Plank Roads While Secretly Marching to Chen Cang." On one hand, he dispatched Fan Kuai, Zhou Bo, and others to lead small forces to repair the burned plank roads, making a show of preparing to advance through the plank roads to attract Xiang Yu's attention. Xiang Yu indeed deployed his main forces near the plank roads for defense. On the other hand, Han Xin personally led the main Han army forces in a covert detour via the old roads to Chen Cang, launching a sudden attack. Because Xiang Yu's forces were drawn to the plank road direction, the defenses at Chen Cang were weak, and the Han army successfully occupied Chen Cang. Subsequently, they rapidly advanced eastward, pacified the three Qin states, and laid the foundation for Liu Bang's unification of Guanzhong. The key to this strategy lies in skillfully exploiting the enemy's habitual thinking patterns. By using superficial actions to deceive the enemy while concealing the true direction of attack, it achieves the goal of striking the enemy by surprise. In ancient frontier wars, some nomadic peoples also employed similar methods. They would maintain a standoff with garrison forces at the front to attract their attention, while secretly dispatching elite troops through small paths or unknown passages to execute a flanking maneuver, creating a pincer movement against the garrison and breaking through the battlefield stalemate.
The Empty Fortress Stratagem: A Daring Display of Psychological Warfare

The Empty Fortress Stratagem is a strategy filled with adventurous spirit and sophisticated psychological warfare. The most famous Empty Fortress Stratagem is that of Zhuge Liang during the Three Kingdoms period. In 228 AD, Zhuge Liang launched his first northern campaign. Due to Ma Su's loss of Jie Ting, the situation of the Shu army took a dramatic turn for the worse. Sima Yi led an army of 150,000 troops in pursuit and advanced directly toward the western city where Zhuge Liang was located. At that time, Zhuge Liang had no great generals at his side, only a group of civil officials. The 5,000 troops he commanded had half of them away transporting grain and supplies, leaving only 2,500 soldiers in the city. In this critical moment, Zhuge Liang did not panic. He ordered all flags and banners to be hidden, kept soldiers in place, and decreed that anyone leaving without permission or making loud noise would be executed immediately. He also ordered the four city gates to be opened, with twenty soldiers on each gate dressed as common people, sweeping streets and sprinkling water. Zhuge Liang himself donned a crane cloak, wore a tall headscarf, led two young attendants, brought a guqin, went to the lookout tower above the city gate, sat by the railing, then slowly began to play the instrument. When the Wei army's advance troops reached below the city, witnessing this display, they did not dare enter the city recklessly and hastily retreated to report to Sima Yi. Upon hearing the report, Sima Yi personally led troops to the city below. Seeing Zhuge Liang sitting calmly on the tower, burning incense and playing his guqin, with the city gates wide open and common people sweeping the streets below without seeming to notice anything, Sima Yi grew suspicious. Knowing that Zhuge Liang was cautious throughout his life and never attempted anything without certainty, the open gates must indicate an ambush. Thus, he ordered his forces to withdraw. In this way, Zhuge Liang successfully resolved a crisis through precise understanding of Sima Yi's psychology. Although the historical authenticity of the Empty Fortress Stratagem has been somewhat disputed, the strategy it demonstrates—using psychological warfare to deceive the enemy in extremely disadvantageous circumstances—has been remembered by posterity. In some small-scale battles or conflicts, when commanding officers are in a position of numerical inferiority, they also employ similar bluffing methods to try to frighten away the enemy or buy time for their own forces.
The Reverse Stratagem: A Hidden Blade to Undermine the Enemy

The reverse stratagem is a strategy to undermine the enemy from within. In ancient warfare, it was widely applied. Taking the Battle of Red Cliffs as an example, in 208 AD, Cao Cao led a massive army southward, preparing to unify southern China in one stroke. The allied forces of Sun and Liu maintained a standoff with Cao's army along the Yangtze River. Cao's forces consisted mostly of northerners unaccustomed to naval combat, so they connected their warships with iron chains. Zhou Yu knew this was the key to defeating Cao, but to execute a fire attack, he first had to eliminate Cao's naval commanders Cai Mao and Zhang Yun. These two were originally generals from Jingzhou who had surrendered and were skilled in naval warfare. Cao Cao sent Jiang Gan to persuade Zhou Yu to surrender. Zhou Yu turned the tables. He entertained Jiang Gan warmly and pretended to get drunk, sharing a bed with him. Jiang Gan seized the opportunity to steal forged letters supposedly from Cai Mao and Zhang Yun collluding with Eastern Wu. The suspicious Cao Cao, unable to verify the letters' authenticity, executed Cai Mao and Zhang Yun. This incident resulted in greatly reduced combat effectiveness of Cao's navy, creating conditions for the Sun-Liu allied forces to execute a fire attack. Subsequently, in many later wars, the reverse stratagem played important roles. For instance, in some wars between minority peoples, one side would deliberately spread false information, causing internal discord and suspicion in the enemy camp, weakening the enemy's cohesion and fighting spirit.
Conclusion and Reflection

All of these mysterious military strategies in ancient warfare were crystallizations of the wisdom of military strategists. Whether through deceiving the enemy, clever strategic arrangements, or psychological warfare, they all played tremendous roles on the battlefield. These strategies not only reflect the warfare situations and military thinking of their time, but also provide abundant material for our modern study of history and understanding of warfare. From these strategies, we can see that warfare is not merely a contest of military forces and weapons, but rather a competition of wisdom and stratagems. In modern society, although the forms of warfare have changed greatly, the wisdom contained in these ancient military strategies still has value as reference. They can be applied to business competition, diplomatic negotiations, and many other fields, helping us make correct decisions and achieve success in complex environments. At the same time, these strategies also show us that when facing difficulties and challenges, we should be good at thinking, brave in innovation, and seek the best paths to solving problems.
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💬 评论 (7)
This is fascinating! I've always wondered how ancient generals managed to coordinate large armies without modern communication. Would love to see more details about specific battles.|
Excellent opening. The "cold weapon era" phrase is interesting—shows this might be translated content. Regardless, the topic deserves deeper exploration. What specific strategies are you planning to cover?|
Great stuff! Reminds me of that time I read about Sun Tzu's Art of War in college. Game-changing material.|
Finally someone is writing about this! Military strategy is an art form that modern warfare has completely lost. The wisdom of ancient commanders like Alexander and Napoleon should be studied in every school.|
Intriguing premise, but the excerpt cuts off abruptly. Hard to judge the quality without seeing the full analysis. Are you actually going to explain the "mysteries" or just tease us with vague references?|
This could be really useful for my thesis research! I'm focusing on logistics and supply lines in medieval warfare. Hope your article goes beyond just battle tactics and explores the organizational side of things.|
The writing has a poetic quality to it—"long river of human history"—very evocative. Even if I'm not a huge military history buff, I'm intrigued enough to keep reading. Well done capturing attention!|